The social value of combative reasoning depends entirely on whether it is situated within a larger system of sensemaking. The private value of high-integrity combative reasoning (vs specious arguments and bad-faith rhetorical appeals) depends on the integrity of that sensemaking.
Adversarial legal systems don't leave it up to the lawyers for the two sides to decide what's true. Judges to adjudicate procedure and decide on points of law, and sometimes separately juries decide on points of fact. By contrast, televised political debates, at least in the US, seem to have long since become an unintelligible posturing contest, such that when available it's easier to understand what's going on by watching the Bad Lip Reading versions of Presidential debates than the ones with real audio.
Noncombative reasoning motivated by selfishly wanting to understand one's own situation in order to make better decisions seems relatively though not perfectly robust to bad social norms, since the perceived benefit of accuracy doesn't depend on others' propensity to reward it.
The social value of combative reasoning depends entirely on whether it is situated within a larger system of sensemaking. The private value of high-integrity combative reasoning (vs specious arguments and bad-faith rhetorical appeals) depends on the integrity of that sensemaking.
Adversarial legal systems don't leave it up to the lawyers for the two sides to decide what's true. Judges to adjudicate procedure and decide on points of law, and sometimes separately juries decide on points of fact. By contrast, televised political debates, at least in the US, seem to have long since become an unintelligible posturing contest, such that when available it's easier to understand what's going on by watching the Bad Lip Reading versions of Presidential debates than the ones with real audio.
Noncombative reasoning motivated by selfishly wanting to understand one's own situation in order to make better decisions seems relatively though not perfectly robust to bad social norms, since the perceived benefit of accuracy doesn't depend on others' propensity to reward it.